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CORPORATIONS-NEW TRENDS IN THE CORPORATE
OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE-Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d
1328 (Miss. 1979).
On August 17, 1970, "Fyr-Pruf" was incorporated by Ben Ellzey
along with Dr. George Bass, Sterling Allen and James B. Lollar for the
purpose of producing fire resistant padding material. The incorpora-
tors initially planned to use the "Bass formula," a process developed by
Dr. Bass to make the padding flame resistant. However, the "Bass for-
mula" proved not to be adaptable to mass production and a contem-
plated patent for the process was never issued. In spite of the lack of
usefulness of the formula, the officers and directors of Fyr-Pruf,
Lollar, Allen, John P. Fox and Marlyn Yarborough, decided to keep
Fyr-Pruf in the business of manufacturing carpet padding without the
flame resistant attribute. Production commenced in October 1970, in a
facility in Batesville, Mississippi, that was leased from the Small Busi-
ness Administration (SBA). The corporation enjoyed moderate success
until April 1971, when ownership of the premises changed and the
company lost the use of the Batesville building.1
The officers and directors of Fyr-Pruf began searching for a new
facility and additional manufacturing equipment. A possible site in
Water Valley, Mississippi, was located through loan negotiations with
the SBA. In an effort to obtain the necessary equipment director-offi-
cer ElIzey, representing Fyr-Pruf, contacted a businessman, Mr. Sam
Lerman, to discuss the purchase by Fyr-Pruf of manufacturing equip-
ment for mass production of carpet padding. Though faced with oper-
ational difficulties, at this time Fyr-Pruf was a solvent corporation,
based solely on balance sheet standards.
2
After several trips to St. Louis, the officers of Fyr-Pruf were able to
reach an agreement for the purchase of the needed equipment. A
$5,000 deposit was given to Lerman, and he agreed to hold the equip-
ment for ten days while Fyr-Pruf arranged financing and secured a
suitable manufacturing facility. However, on June 23, 1971, the SBA
notified Fyr-Pruf that its application for a loan in connection with the
Water Valley facility had been denied.
3
On June 24, one day after the loan rejection, the corporate charter
for a rival company, Bondafoam, Inc. was issued.' Bondafoam was
formed for the purpose of manufacturing carpet padding by
'Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1330 (Miss. 1979).
'id. at 1331. The corporation's assets exceeded its liabilities as evidenced by an audit-
ed financial statement of March 31, 1971. One item, listed on the statement as an asset,
was an account receivable in the amount of $40,000, representing an amount owed to
the corporation as payment for stock. This and one other questionable item appeared on
the balance sheet. Id.
3ld.
'Brief for Appellant at 7, ElIzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328 (Miss. 1979).
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Yarborough, Allen, and Lollar, who still held their positions as officers
and directors of Fyr-Pruf. Aided by the skills, experience and capital
provided by these men, Bondafoam became a successful manufacturer
of carpet padding. Bondafoam operated in the facility located in Wa-
ter Valley, and used equipment purchased from Mr. Lerman. At the
time of Bondafoam's purchase, the equipment was indispensable to
Fyr-Pruf's expectation of establishing a new manufacturing plant. The
organizers of Bondafoam were aware of the equipment because of
their part in the negotiations with Lerman on behalf of Fyr-Pruf. Evi-
dence suggested that the purchase was carried on secretly to make it
impossible for the complaining directors and officers to participate in
the venture.'
Following these developments Ben Ellzey, George Bass and J. L.
Johnson filed a suit which, after amendment, became a stockholders'
derivative action. The complaint alleged that Fyr-Pruf directors and
officers, Yarborough, Lollar, Allen and Fox, had usurped corporate op-
portunities belonging to Fyr-Pruf. The trial court placed on complain-
ants the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence all the
issues presented by the case. After a determination that this burden
had not been met, the action was dismissed with prejudice.7
Upon appeal by the stockholders, the Mississippi Supreme Court
found that the chancellor had erred in his application of the burden of
proof,' and held that the complainants had made a prima facie show-
ing of usurpation of a corporate opportunity.' The court reversed the
chancellor's decision and remanded the case to the court for further
deliberations. 10
The court acknowledged that the issues presented by the case upon
appeal required it to assess the pleading and proof of this type of de-
rivative action in Mississippi. The court expressed that this opinion
would reflect a decision on what proof is required of a complainant
alleging usurpation of a "corporate opportunity," as well as "the char-
acter of the required proof, the precise role of financial inability of the
corporation to take advantage of the opportunity, and how the fidu-
ciary may absolve himself of liability once the complainant has estab-
lished a prima facie case."1
The fundamental import of Elizey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc. becomes appar-
ent when it is recognized that it represents the first time in almost a
half-century that the Mississippi Supreme Court has directly addressed
these specific issues in a derivative action for usurpation of a corporate









opportunity by one who stood in a fiduciary relationship to that corpo-
ration.12 Realizing that corporate law has undergone many changes in
the span since this issue was last considered, the court made a careful
examination of Mississippi law as applied to modern day situations.
The court also, in gauging the continuing validity of the "stale" Missis-
sippi decisions, looked to more recent decisions on the same issues
from other states. In doing so, the court ultimately reached what it
considered satisfactory and practical requisites for pleading and prov-
ing cases involving corporate opportunity.
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
The culpability of officers and directors in the area of ursupation of
corporate opportunity has as its foundation a well-settled principle of
law, that corporate officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relation-
ship to their corporations and therefore owe a duty of undivided loyal-
ty and good faith." One component of this principle of undivided loy-
alty is the concept that because of the fiduciary relationship a director
or officer should refrain from competing with his corporation or from
appropriating for his personal benefit an opportunity that should, in
the interests of justice, belong to his corporation. 4 This rule is known
as the doctrine of corporate opportunity."' If an officer or director is
found to have breached his fiduciary duty in a case involving a true
corporate opportunity the monetary profit or other gain realized may
be impressed with a constructive trust inuring to the benefit of the
wronged corporation.'
6
In the landmark case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 7 which involved the
personal purchase of Pepsi-Cola Co. stock by the president of Loft,
Inc., a beverage manufacturer, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated
the rule as follows:
tif there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially able to undertake,
"Not since Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, had the Mississippi Supreme Court
been squarely faced with a case of seizure of a corporate opportunity. 168 Miss. 334, 151
So. 161 (1933).
'American Empire Life Ins. Co. v. McAdory, 319 So. 2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1975). See,
e.g., In re County Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F. Supp. 701, 707 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 110 Colo. 454, 461, 135 P.2d 1007, 1010 (1943);
Italo-American Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 40 Del. 534, 549-50, 14 A.2d
401, 408 (1940); Flight Equip. & Eng'r Corp. v. Shelton, 103 So. 2d 615, 626 (Fla. 1958);
LeMire v. Galloway, 130 Fla. 101, 108, 177 So. 283, 286 (1937). See also Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
143 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 861.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
"Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974).
Sid.
" 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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[which] is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation's business and is
of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an inter-
est or reasonable expectancy, and by embracing the opportunity, the
self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into conflict with
that of his corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the opportu-
nity for himself.'9
There have been three different standards enunciated by the courts
at various times for making a determination of the existence of a cor-
porate opportunity. 9 The "interest or expectancy- 20 test requires that
the acquisition for which the officer or director is sought to be held
liable be one in which the corporation has an existing legal interest or
an expectancy arising from an existing right.
2 The "line of business"'22
test sets out the requirement that the complaining corporation be de-
prived of an opportunity having "the inherent aptitude of being inte-
grated into the existing business of the company."' The third standard
used by the courts to determine if a business opportunity is also a cor-
porate one is the "fairness" test.2' In utilizing the fairness test the
courts apply ethical standards to the facts of the case to determine
what outcome would be fair and equitable under the particular cir-
cumstances.21
The "interest or expectancy" test has been criticized as being
2621vague and lenient.? Moreover, some decisions purporting to apply
the "line of business" test seem also to be couched in terms of fair-
"Id. at 272-73, 5 A.2d at 511.
"Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 221-22, 222 N.W.2d 71, 79 (1974); Comment, The
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 18 S.W.L.J. 96, 97 (1964).
"Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 2d 161 (1973).
"Early in the history of corporate opportunity the courts construed this requirement
quite stringently. In Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., the lime company owned
a one-third interest in a limestone quarry, had contracted to purchase a one-third inter-
est, and had been negotiating for the remaining one-third interest. Defendant directors
purchased the outstanding interests personally. The Alabama court invoked a construc-
tive trust against the one-third interest that was subject to the contract to purchase while
finding no breach of fiduciary duty in the acquisition of the one-third interest that the
company had merely been negotiating for. 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
"23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"Turner v. American Metal Co., 268 App. Div. 239, 252, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 800, 813 (App.
Div. 1944).
"'Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 199, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (1948).
"Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 109 A.2d 558 (1954).
2626 FORDHAM L. REV. 528, 529 (1957). But see Burg v. Horn 380 F.2d 897, 899 (2d
Cir. 1967) (U. S. District Court applying New York law in diversity case held the test of
corporate opportunity in New York to be the interest or.expectancy test).
'Rosenblum v. Judson Eng'r Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 272, 109 A.2d 558, 563 (1954). "The
opinions in Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 and Pio-
neer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 relied on by the defendants,
appear to us to adopt too lax a conception of the requirements of fiduciary loyalty." Id.
[Vol. 2:63
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ness.28 This leads to the conclusion that the corporate opportunity doc-
trine is an unsettled, oscillating doctrine deserving of clarification. The
Ellzey court, recognizing the need for clarification of the law of corpo-
rate opportunity in Mississippi, looked to the law of other jurisdictions.
The case of Miller v. Miller,29 handed down by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in 1974, was relied on by the court as a guideline to modern
views of the doctrine. Although the court in Miller found that the op-
portunity in controversy was noncorporate, it set out the test for deter-
mining the existence of a corporate opportunity, consisting of a combi-
nation of the "line of business" and "fairness" tests."0
The Miller test is a two-step process involving, first, a finding of
whether the business opportunity under consideration is a corporate
one. Several factors should be considered by the fact-finder in making
the determination including, inter alia, the relationship between the
opportunity and the business purpose of the corporation, the power of
the corporation to embrace the opportunity, the adaptability of the
opportunity to the business of the corporation, the possibility of harm
to the corporation by allowing the opportunity to be acquired by oth-
ers, and the insolvency or lack of financial ability of the corporation to
grasp the opportunity."' As to the findings based on the consideration
of these factors the Minnesota court stated:
If the facts are undisputed that the business opportunity presented
bears no logical or reasonable relation to the existing or prospective busi-
ness activities of the corporation or that it lacks either the financial or
fundamental practical or technical ability to pursue it, then such oppor-
tunity would have to be found to be noncorporate as a matter of law.2
The court further stated, however, if the evidence pertaining to these
factors was conflicting, a question of fact would arise and the burden
of proof rest on the complaining party. The court indicated that if this
burden is met and a corporate opportunity exists, the officer or direc-
tor charged with acquiring it would be required to establish that he
acted with good faith and dealt fairly with the corporation in discharg-
ing his fiduciary duty, or he would be subjected to liability." In the
second step of the Miller process several significant factors were con-
sidered in making the ultimate determination of whether to impose
liability. Among these factors were the amount of corporate control
28See American Inv. Co. of IlI. v, Lichtenstein, 134 F. Supp. 857, 863 (D. Mo. 1955)
(interpreted Guth v. Loft as applying the fairness test).
"301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
"Id. at 224-25, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
lIt appears that the Miller test encompasses all three tests under consideration here, as
one factor listed by the court was whether the corporation "had an interest or an expec-
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vested in the officer, whether he disclosed the existence of the oppor-
tunity to the shareholders and board of directors, the extent to which
the corporation was harmed or benefited, whether he received the op-
portunity as an individual or a representative of the corporation, and
other facts or situations determinative of his good faith."'
"CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY" IN MISSISSIPPI
The doctrine of corporate opportunity was first considered in Mis-
sissippi in the case of Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson," a 1933
case in which Anderson, secretary-treasurer and a member of the
board of Pioneer, was accused by his corporation of fraudulently ac-
quiring a personal interest in two oil and gas leases to the detriment of
Pioneer. In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint the
Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the "interest or expectancy" test
set out in the Alabama case of Lagarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone
Co.,3 6 and held that the corporation did not acquire an expectancy in
the lease because of mere negotiations for its purchase. 7 In a later Mis-
sissippi decision, Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood," the court
dealt with a similar but different aspect of the rule requiring undivid-
ed loyalty to the corporation, that of conflicting interest in the form of
"self-dealing."39 Knox involved the leasing of trucks to the corporation
by officers and directors. Though not strictly a case of corporate op-
portunity the Mississippi court applied reasoning similar to that later
expounded in Miller'°-that once a conflict between the interests of
the corporation and that of an officer or director is shown, the burden
shifts to the fiduciary to justify his actions in the equitable sense.41
ANALYSIS
Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf represents the first time the Mississippi Supreme
Court has squarely considered the doctrine of corporate opportunity in
forty-six years.' In Ellzey the court was faced with applying a doc-
1d. at 226, 222 N.W.2d at 81-82. The court also injected the proverbial "reasonable
man" into the deliberations when it added as a consideration, "whether he exercised the
diligence, devotion, care and fairness toward the corporation which ordinarily prudent
men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions." Id.
'168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933).
3"126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
'168 Miss. at 346, 151 So. at 164.
'228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956).
19H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 238 (2d. ed. 1970).
"0301 Minn. 207, 222 N.W.2d 71 (1974).
228 Miss. at 741, 89 So. 2d at 814.
"But see American Empire Life Ins. Co. v. McAdory, 319 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1975).
The court considered a case involving the doctrine, but the questions presented dealt




trine that had undergone many changes since it was last considered by
the Mississippi court. The court had to decide if it would adhere to the
seemingly outdated "interest or expectancy" test as it did in Pioneer"5
or follow the lead of other jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, and adopt
a less rigid and more equitable test. The court had to determine the
requirements to be met by a complainant attempting to make out a
prima facie case alleging the unlawful acquisition of a corporate op-
portunity by its officers and directors."
In deciding what proof is required of a complainant in a corporate
opportunity case the court adopted certain requirements of the first
part of the Miller test. In Elizey Chief Justice Patterson seemed to
subdivide the first step of the Miller test into two parts when he stated:
[T]he Minnesota Court seems to lay down a two-portion test for deter-
mining whether a complainant has made out a prima facie case of con-
flict of interest arising from the fact that the business opportunity in
question is a corporate opportunity. The first asks whether the com-
plainant has shown the business opportunity to be reasonably related to
the existing or prospective business activities of the corporation. The sec-
ond asks whether the plaintiff has shown the financial ability of the
corporation to seize the opportunity.4
The Mississippi Supreme Court seemed to agree with the Minnesota
court in that a fiduciary should not be held liable for participating
'in a business opportunity that "bears only a remote relationship to
the operations of his corporation." '46 However, after this point Mis-
sissippi and Minnesota differ. The Miller test requires that the
plaintiff bear the burden of showing the financial ability of a corpo-
ration to acquire the opportunity in question. The Mississippi court
on the other hand seemed to adopt a median position between the
holding in Urban J. Alexander Co. v. Trinkle' and that of Irving
Trust Co. v. Deutsch.'
According to the holding in Urban J. Alexander Co. the finan-
cial inability of a solvent corporation to acquire the opportunity
prevents a finding of liability.4 9 In Irving the defendant directors
were accused of personally purchasing stock that was sought by
their corporation after having been directed to obtain sufficient
"'168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933).
"376 So. 2d at 1332.
45Id. at 1334. The first part of Chief Justice Patterson's statement appears to be the
"'line of business" test utilized in Guth.
"Id. at 1333.
'311 Ky. 635, 224 S.W.2d 923 (1949).
473 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935).
4'311 Ky. at 640-42, 224 S.W.2d at 926-27. See, e.g., Hannerty v. Standard Theatre
Co., 109 Mo. 297, 305, 19 S.W. 82, 84 (1892). Accord Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512,
519 (Del. Ch. 1978).
1980]
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funds to allow the corporation to purchase the stock. In finding that
the directors had breached their fiduciary duties the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit placed no emphasis on the
financial inability of the corporation to purchase the stock. Judge
Swan, speaking for the Second Circuit, stated when commenting of
the facts of Irving: "Nevertheless, they tend to show the wisdom of
a rigid rule forbidding directors of a solvent corporation to take
over for their own profit a corporate contract on the plea of the
corporation's financial inability to perform.""s
The ElIzey opinion seemed to reject the Irving theory that short of
insolvency, financial inability is irrelevant, labeling it as "too ex-
treme"'" while accepting it somewhat in principle in the statement of
required proof for establishing a prima facie case of corporate oppor-
tunity. 2 Nevertheless, the court indicated that financial ability should
play some part in the determination of whether a business opportunity
is corporate when it stated, "while financial ability is not irrelevant, in
our opinion, it is certainly not determinative, nor is it invariably an
essential element of complainant's prima facie case of usurpation of a
corporate opportunity.-
5 3
Two factors were significant in raising the question of financial
ability of the corporation in ElIzey. Both concerned items which were
carried as assets on Fyr-Pruf's books. The first concerned whether
$40,000 worth of Fyr-Pruf stock carried on a March 31, 1971 financial
statement as "RECEIVABLE FROM STOCK HOLDERS" was prop-
erly reflected as an asset, since the stock had never been paid for. The
evidence on this point conflicted and the chancellor, after placing the
burden of proof of all issues on the complainants, concluded that this
entry in Fyr-Pruf's books was improperly reflected as an asset.54 The
second item that was shown as an asset on the financial statement was
certain equipment that Fyr-Pruf possessed subject to outstanding liens.
The supreme court had to consider whether the value of this equip-
5073 F.2d at 124. See, e.g., Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 92-93,
127 A.2d 885, 892 (1956). But see 39 KY. L. J. 229, 233 (1950-51). The author criticizes
this rule of "'uncompromising rigidity" and says the defense of financial inability should
be allowed when clearly established as it is the far more practicable and equitable rule.
Id.
376 So. 2d at 1334.
521d. at 1335. "First it must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that under
all the facts and circumstances the business opportunity is logically related to the corpo-
ration's existing or prospective activities. Second, the complainant must prove that the
corporation was either (a) not insolvent in the balance sheet sense at the relevant times
or (b) financially disabled as a result of non-payment of a debt or breach of a fiduciary
duty by one or more of the defendants." Id. (emphasis added). In regard to (b), see
Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 92-93, 127 A.2d 885, 892 (1956).
376 So. 2d at 1335. See Morad v. Coupounas, 361 So. 2d 6 (Ala. 1978) (usurpation of
corporate opportunity found, although some evidence indicated financial inability).
'"376 So. 2d at 1332.
[Vol. 2:63
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ment and the effect of the legal title on its status as an asset were
properly considered by the chancellor in the court below. The court
found that the chancellor had improperly placed the burden of proof
as to the accounting for the $40,000 item on the complainant-
appellant.5 Concerning the equipment, the supreme court found that
it "represented a net asset of Fyr-Pruf to the extent its value exceeded
any indebtedness secured by it"" and that who held the legal title was
not an important consideration.57
Once a complainant sustains his burden of proving that a business
opportunity is also a corporate one the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that he has not violated his fiduciary duty of good faith and
fair dealings.5" This is in line with the principles stated in the second
step of the Miller" process and the holding in Knox Glass Bottle Co. v.
Underwood."' While Knox involved "self-dealing"'" and not corporate
opportunity, the court felt that since both principles involved conflict-
ing interests between directors and their corporations, the same stan-
dards should apply to some aspects of the determination of either. In
both instances, the conduct of the directors should be viewed as a pos-
sible equitable counterbalance which could prevent the imposition of
liability.62 However, good faith alone is not sufficient to absolve the
fiduciary of liability.
The court placed little faith in the chancellor's finding that there
was a "business competition doctrine""3 exception to the corporate op-
portunity doctrine that allows competition so long as the directors act
in good faith, and if the rival business is not actually detrimental to the
corporation."' Quoting another source, the majority stated, "It is diffi-
cult to imagine how directors may enter into an 'independent busi-
ness,' at least as owners and managers of the business, after acceptance
of their membership on the board and during their service as directors
'ld. at 1331.
"I1d. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-504(2) (Supp. 1980). "[If the security interest se-
cures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus,
and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency." Id.
5'7 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-202 (1972) provides that "each provision of this chapter
with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the
secured party or in the debtor."
376 So. 2d at 1335.
"9301 Minn. at 226, 222 N.W.2d at 81.
"°228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956).
"There was a "self-dealing" aspect of Elizey in that one of the defendants sold certain
raw materials to Fyr-Pruf at a profit of lo per pound. The court found that the chancel-
lor had not erred in finding that the transactions were mutually advantageous and had
been fully disclosed to and ratified by Fyr-Pruf. 376 So. 2d at 1332.
21d. at 1332, 1335.
"See The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine 18 S.W.L.J. 96, 101 (1964). See also Tor-
rea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 121, 412 P.2d 47, 57 (1966).
"*376 So. 2d at 1334.
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in competition with their corporation without acting in bad faith.""5
Thus the court properly rejected the idea that such an exception ex-
ists."6
CONCLUSION
It seems that Mississippi has come to the forefront in the area of
corporate opportunity. By shifting from the rigid "interest" require-
ments of Pioneer" to the notions of fundamental fairness outlined in
Elizey the court seems to follow the trend of decisions in recent dec-
ades in protecting the minority stockholder from the whims of an un-
scrupulous director. This appears to stem from an underlying judicial
recognition that directors should be under an affirmative duty to pro-
tect and advance the interests of the corporation and, therefore, those
of its stockholders.6" Further evidence of this judicial recognition is the
court's modification of the Miller test as to financial ability of the cor-
poration to take advantage of an opportunity. By allowing a corporate
opportunity to be found even where financial inability may exist the
court lightened the burden of a complaining stockholder while making
the task of a defendant director to absolve himself of wrongdoing a bit
more onerous. While Ellzey should serve as a guiding light for future
considerations of corporate opportunity for all jurisdictions, one may
only guess if it represents the height of judicial relaxation of the re-
quirements for a prima facie case. 9
Lonnie D. Bailey
"Id. (quoting Lattin, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 79 at 287 (2d ed. 1971)).
"376 So. 2d at 1334. The court found that the Mississippi Constitution would prevent
the application of such a doctrine without consent of a majority of the stockholders.
MISS. CONST. art. 7, § 194.
6168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161 (1933). The court distinguished Pioneer but did not ex-
pressly overrule it. Apparently it felt that the opportunity presented to Pioneer was not
in the line of business of the company, making it noncorporate under the Ellzey test.
376 So. 2d at 1336.
"18 S.W.L.J., supra note 63 at 115.
"At the time of this writing Elizey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc. was on remand for a determina-
tion of whether the defendants had discharged their fiduciary obligations to Fyr-Pruf.
376 So. 2d at 1336.
The author feels, however, that the court intended to settle the question of corporate
opportunity in Mississippi and that the outcome of a new trial, if one is had, will have
no bearing on the principles stated in the opinion and considered in this note.
[Vol. 2:63
